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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the problem of routing a navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG), 
or other groups of ships, through a maritime chokepoint that presents one or more shore-
based missile threats.  The goal is to identify a path that minimizes risk to the CSG’s 
HVU (High Value Unit, i.e., the CSG’s aircraft carrier).  The HVU’s escort ships are 
assigned optimal positions relative to the HVU during the transit to maximize the overall 
probability of avoiding and/or defeating attacks.  The problem is formulated and solved 
as a maximum-reliability path problem in a network:  The operating environment is 
discretized into a grid of nodes that represents potential waypoints, escort formations, and 
travel directions; arcs define allowable transitions between nodes.  An arc parameter 
represents the probability of successfully transiting between two adjacent nodes, 
computed as a function of formation, direction of travel, threat, and line-of-sight visibility 
between any threats and the CSG.  A test scenario, with a node spacing of 2.5 nautical 
miles, approximates the Strait of Hormuz.  The model solves in a fraction of a second on 
a personal computer.  Results show that the CSG typically places escorts ahead of the 
HVU, and always between the HVU and the closest threat. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis develops a model and algorithm to calculate the safest route possible 
for a navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) that must transit a maritime chokepoint while 
subject to one or more shore-based missile threats.  The notional CSG consists of a high-
value unit (HVU), i.e., the strike group’s aircraft carrier, and its escort ships.  The 
algorithm identifies the optimal route for the HVU, which also includes the best relative 
stations for each of its missile-defense escorts during each leg of the transit.  Specific sets 
of escort stations are enumerated and referred to herein as “configurations.” 
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has conducted work related to the topic of 
this thesis.  Specifically, NRL has developed an algorithm to assess Anti-Air Warfare 
(AAW) engagement capabilities for U.S. Navy ships based on radio-frequency (RF) 
propagation of threat radar.  This algorithm estimates an HVU’s probability of survival at 
a given location based on threat radar capabilities and engagement geometry for a single 
escort against a single threat.  The goal of this thesis is to develop an algorithm that will 
use those probabilities to automatically find a minimum-risk route for a group of ships, 
such as a CSG. 
The problem is formulated and solved using a maximum-reliability path model 
(XRP), whose solution yields an optimal transit path for the CSG through a notional sea 
space called the “area of transit” (AT).  XRP discretizes the “area of transit” (AT) into a 
network of vertices and edges representing potential waypoints and movement between 
waypoints, respectively.  Vertices are then “expanded” to represent potential waypoints, 
escort configurations, and directions of travel; expanded edges then connect waypoints, 
but also represent transitions between configurations and directions of travel. 
Independence between edges is assumed, and an edge parameter represents the 
probability of successfully transiting between two adjacent waypoints, along with making 
any changes in configuration and direction of travel.  The solution algorithm is a variant 
of a shortest-path algorithm.  It operates implicitly on the expanded network and 
maximizes the product of success probabilities across the edges in a path.  Success 
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probabilities are computed as a function of configuration; direction of travel; threats; and 
distance and line-of-sight visibility to those threats. 
The test scenario for this thesis defines an approximation of the Strait of Hormuz 
as the CSG’s AT.  The network is constructed to cover the entire AT and its bordering 
entry and exit points in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf, respectively.  Five shore-
based missile sites threaten the AT, and four escorts defend the HVU.  The CSG can 
transition between 16 different configurations and eight directions of travel at every node; 
however, only certain configuration transitions are allowed because of transit-speed 
constraints.  XRP calculates and then writes to a text file the maximum-reliability route 
through the AT by vertex location, configuration, and direction of travel.  Results also 
display the computed cumulative probabilities of successful passage at each waypoint in 
the route. 
A number of simplifying assumptions have been made, but the assumptions are 
reasonable for a prototype, and the optimal routes identified by the algorithm appear to be 
good.  Also, in order to keep this research unclassified, no real threat data, such as 
probabilities of kill, are used. 
The XRP solution algorithm is written in C++ and runs on a desktop PC; an 
optimal solution is identified in a fraction of a second.  Results show that based on transit 
geometry in the AT, the CSG keeps threats at a maximum distance by staying close to 
“untransitable areas” such as shoal water and land.  The CSG also relies primarily on 
configurations that place escorts ahead of the HVU, and always between the HVU and 
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Safe transit through maritime chokepoints is critical for the United States Navy to 
fulfill its mission of maintaining freedom of the seas.  Command of littoral (coastal) 
waters has become a priority in recent years, and access to many littoral regions of the 
world requires unhindered passage through maritime chokepoints.  This thesis develops a 
mission-planning aid in support of a hypothetical navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) that 
needs to make a transit through such a chokepoint, while subject to one or more shore-
based cruise-missile threats.  Specifically, given a CSG consisting of one HVU (High-
Value Unit, i.e., an aircraft carrier) and several escorts that defend the HVU, the planning 
aid identifies a path, and escort formations along that path, that maximize the probability 
that the HVU makes the transit safely. 
A. BACKGROUND 
This problem was introduced to us by Mr. Ian Will at the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, DC.  NRL is developing an algorithm for assessing 
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) engagement capabilities for ships based on radio-frequency 
(RF) propagation of threat radar (Sjoberg et al., 2006).  This algorithm will estimate an 
HVU’s probability of survival at a given location based on threat radar capabilities and 
engagement geometry for a single escort.  The goal of this thesis is to develop an 
algorithm that can use those probabilities to automatically find a minimum-risk path for a 
CSG. 
At this time, NRL’s simulation techniques are too slow to provide all the 
probabilities needed for the path-finding algorithm in a reasonable amount of time, that 
is, fast enough for the path-finding algorithm to be used as an operational tool (Sjoberg et 
al., 2006).  Another concern is properly accounting for AAW capabilities when multiple 
ships are tasked with the HVU’s defense.  NRL is also looking for ways to speed up 




thesis will assume that the probability of successful defense for a single escort is 
available, and will combine probabilities for multiple escorts under the assumption of 
independence. 
NRL uses the term “defender” to mean any AAW-capable ship.  The HVU is the 
“defender” in this thesis, and “escort” means any AAW-capable ship in the CSG.  AAW-
capable ships comprise Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CGs) and Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers (DDGs) with the AEGIS combat weapons system.  The model developed in 
this thesis computes the defender’s approximate probability of successful defense and 
passage between waypoints in the AT; the threat to each segment of the path comes from 
shore-based anti-ship cruise-missile (ASCM) sites.  Probability of survival can be 
computed assuming the HVU has any number of escorts, although all tests are restricted 
to four.  A variant on a shortest-path network model, a “maximum-reliability path model” 
(XRP), then defines a path through the chokepoint that minimizes total risk for the HVU, 
and the optimal configuration of escorts for each path.  A variant on a shortest-path 
algorithm solves XRP model instances. 
The XRP model applies to any maritime chokepoint, although the Strait of 
Hormuz provides the test scenario in this thesis. Other examples of maritime chokepoints 
include the Strait of Gibraltar between Spain and Morocco, and the Strait of Malacca 
between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the Malaysian peninsula. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Previous Work 
Naval Postgraduate School Professors Johannes Royset and Kevin Wood have 
collaborated with Ian Will to develop a working example of a minimum-risk path 
algorithm.  Royset and Wood (2007) have modified the technology used to find 
minimum-risk paths for aircraft to help solve the CSG-routing problem.  The model uses 
a bearing-based metric for predicting defensive capabilities for a single escort, and the 
positions (bearings) of a set of escorts, called a “configuration” here (but often referred to 
as an “escort formation” in the U.S. Navy) are combined, under independence, to specify 
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the defensive capability of the CSG.  For instance, a standard configuration might put two 
of the CSG’s escorts in front of the HVU, one on each side of the bow, and put two 
escorts behind the HVU, one on each quarter.  But, if the only possible threats lie directly 
in front of the HVU, the preferred configuration might put all four escorts in positions 
ahead of the HVU, configured around the HVU’s port and starboard bow, and possibly 
on the port and starboard beam. 
For a transiting CSG, Royset and Wood construct a “physical network” 
( , )G V E=  with vertices v V∈  representing waypoints in the ocean, that are connected 
by edges, ( , )u v E∈  that define potential movements (ignoring escort configurations).  
Each vertex in G  is then “expanded” into an abstract network ( , )H N A=  consisting of 
nodes, i N∈ , connected by arcs ( , )k i j A= ∈ .  A node ,i v f=  corresponds to a vertex 
v  and an escort configuration f .  Thus, arcs allow transitions between physical locations 
and configurations, although some possible transitions are disallowed because of physical 
constraints.  A path in the expanded network from some node ,s f  to some node ,t f ′  
corresponds to a path in the physical network from start vertex s  where the CSG enters 
the AT, to an end vertex t  where it exits the AT, along with the various configurations 
and directions of travel that the CSG uses along the path. 
If we let kφ  denote the probability of successfully transiting arc k , i.e., with no 
successful missile strikes, then the probability of a successful transit along a path of arcs 






∏ ,         (1) 







−∑ .          (2) 
Thus, a minimum-risk path can be computed using standard shortest-path calculations if 
the “length” of arc k  is defined as log kφ−  (e.g., Royset et al. 2008).  Transitions 
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between configurations are limited in order to model speed constraints: the CSG’s escorts 
will have specified stationing-speed restrictions and will be unable to transition into 
specific sectors relative to the HVU.  For example, given the CSG’s speed of advance, 
maneuvering from dead astern of the HVU to directly ahead may be infeasible. 
The model developed by Royset and Wood (2007) is related to the constrained 
shortest-path model (CSP) in Royset et al. (2008) used for routing military aircraft.  The 
latter paper uses a two- or three-dimensional network to model aircraft transiting two- or 
three-dimensional space, respectively.  The solution to this model routes aircraft from 
origin to target to minimize the risk of destruction from ground-based surface-to-air 
missile sites (and possibly other threats), while placing constraints on fuel consumption 
and/or flight time. 
This thesis uses a model that looks much like the minimum-risk CSP model for 
aircraft routing, except that standardized probabilities are computed much differently and 
only a two-dimensional network is relevant.  Factors such as flight time and/or fuel 
constraints, which are critical to aircraft routing, are irrelevant to this particular ship-
routing problem.  Critical to this problem is the configuration of escort ships in the CSG, 
because those configurations affect the risk imposed on the HVU from threat missiles. 
One innovation in this research, versus Royset and Wood, is that the expanded 
network adds direction of travel in order to represent probability of survival more 
accurately.  We use a maximum-reliability path model (XRP), and solution algorithm, to 
find a minimum-risk path.  The algorithm operates on an implicit representation of the 
expanded network instead of an explicit one, and directly maximizes (1), rather than 
minimizing (2).  Chapter III discusses XRP in more detail. 
Nothing like the aircraft-routing model of Royset et al. exists for naval surface 
applications.  This thesis attempts to fill the gap. 
2. Navy Tactical Publications 
Two Navy Tactical Memorandums (TMs) are relevant to this research.  Written 
by the Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG), these TMs are intended for use by 
 5
task force commanders, strike group staffs, ships’ commanding officers and their 
respective Air Defense (AD) training teams.  Both TMs are classified at the secret level; 
the following three paragraphs describe general features of each at the unclassified level. 
TM 3-01.4-05 (2005), entitled AEGIS Overland Tactics (U), provides 
performance capabilities and limitations of the Aegis Weapons System (AWS) in an 
overland environment, and identifies controllable and uncontrollable factors in each 
phase of an Aegis ship’s engagement sequence.  It also includes terrain-analysis charts 
for the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and other littoral regions (TM 3-01.4-05 2005, p. 
EX-1). 
TM 3-01.5-01, entitled Air Defense Ship Stationing in a Littoral Antiship Missile 
Environment (U), addresses a widely held concern: how to best station combatant ships 
with respect to high-value naval and commercial vessels to maximize protection against a 
known threat in a littoral region.  Historically, Aegis ships have been employed in an 
open-ocean environment, unencumbered by close proximity to land.  The ships have used 
the concept of “defense-in-depth,” which includes the capability to engage an air threat at 
a distance of 100 nautical miles (nm) in the open ocean.  But in a littoral environment, the 
threat may originate at a distance of 20 nm or less.  Rapid threat detection and 
engagement become critical for ship survivability in this case. 
Although Aegis ships’ sensors have been improved in recent years, little has been 
done to investigate the effectiveness of their weapons in close proximity to land.  
Because of the reduced distance and time factors experienced in littoral regions and 
chokepoints, proper AD planning is even more critical than before (TM 3-01.5-01, 2003, 
p. EX-1).  TM 3-01.5-01 provides model and simulation data to assist AD planners in 
developing and improving AD capabilities for their ships. 
Though this thesis differs in its approach, its goal is the same as the TMs 
described above: improve AD planning and make surface ships more effective in missile-
threat situations in a littoral environment. 
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C. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SOLUTION-METHOD OUTLINE 
The maximum-reliability path for a CSG will describe a physical route through a 
chokepoint, along with appropriate escort configurations for each leg of the path; the path 
will maximize the HVU’s probability of survival (i.e., minimizes “risk”) when threatened 
by shore-based Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs).  Path risk through a chokepoint 
depends on factors such as escort-ship configuration relative to the HVU and threat 
locations.  The fact that a configuration is relative to the HVU means that direction of 
travel will also be tracked in the XRP model.  We let d D∈  indicate direction of travel in 
the expanded network, and add d  to Royset and Wood’s formulation (Royset and Wood 
2007) so that a node is represented by , ,i v f d= . 
Several assumptions simplify the calculation of Akφ , the probability of 
successfully transiting arc k .  First, one specific type of shore-based threat ASCM is 
used: the C-802, which was developed in the mid-1980s by China (Jane’s Naval Weapon 
Systems 2006, pp. 287-289).  In order to keep this research unclassified, the C-802 is 
assumed to have a nominal threat range of 25 nm.  We assume a precomputed probability 
of successful defense for a single escort in a given configuration and direction of travel at 
each vertex in the network assuming the threat remains constant for a standard distance 
equal to the maximum physical length of any arc, and use those values to compute Niφ , 
the probability of a successful defense at each node , ,i v f d=  in the expanded network 
(i.e., the probability of successful defense against all threats at each vertex, for each 
possible multi-escort configuration and direction of travel, assuming that the threat 
remains constant over a standard distance).  Finally, we assume that the probability of 
successfully transiting from i N∈  to j N∈  along arc ( , )i j —this  is Akφ  where 
( , )k i j= —is an average of iφ  and jφ , weighted by the physical length of the arc.  This is 
a crude assumption, but should suffice for demonstration purposes. 
Consider a CSG consisting of an aircraft carrier and four AAW-capable escort 
ships.  The CSG must safely transit the Strait of Hormuz to gain entry to the Arabian Gulf 
and begin its mission tasking in the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR).  As the 
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chokepoint region in this case, the Strait of Hormuz is referred to as the Area of Transit 
(AT), and the Arabian Gulf is referred to as the AOR (Figure 1). 
The best configuration during a transit is complicated and can change as the 
transit progresses.  For instance, if escorts are positioned directly between a threat 
missile’s path and the HVU, the probability of the missile hitting the HVU is low.  And, 
based on transit geometry in the AT, we see that (a) if there are equal threats on either 
side of the CSG, then the best position for four escorts would be two on the HVU’s port 
beam, and two on the HVU’s starboard beam, (b) as the CSG moves into a threat area, 
any threats are probably positioned in the direction of travel, so, initially, the escorts 
should lead the HVU, and (c) as the CSG leaves the threat area, any threat is probably 
astern of the HVU, so the escorts should trail the HVU. 
The remainder of the thesis is outlined as follows.  Chapter II introduces the XRP 
model for transiting a chokepoint; Chapter III describes how to solve XRP using an 
“implicit maximum-reliability path algorithm” (IXRPA); Chapter IV describes a test 
scenario and presents corresponding computational results; and Chapter V presents a 




Figure 1.   Entrance to the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz (source: Microsoft 
MapPoint). 
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II. A MAXIMUM-RELIABILITY PATH MODEL FOR SHIP 
ROUTING 
This chapter begins by discussing a generic maximum-reliability path network 
model (XRP), and defines the physical network used to represent the AT.  We then 
describe the expanded network on which XRP is defined, and define escort 
configurations, direction on travel, and sector representation in the model.  The chapter 
concludes with a description of the probabilities of successful defense used in our 
formulation. 
A. MAXIMUM-RELIABILITY PATHS 
This research models the CSG-routing problem as the problem of finding a 
minimum-risk path in a network.  This is, essentially, a “maximum-reliability path.”  A 
generic maximum-reliability path problem is closely related to the formulation of a 
shortest-path problem (Bobzin 2005, p.107).  Standard shortest-path calculations seek to 
minimize the sum of arc “lengths” in a network.  The formulation of a maximum-
reliability path, however, treats arcs as a measure of reliability, and the reliability of a 
directed path P  is given by the product (rather than the sum) of the reliability of arcs in 
the path (Ahuja et al., 1993, p. 130).  The maximum-reliability path problem, then, is to 
identify a directed path in the network from the source vertex s  to the terminal vertex t  
that maximizes reliability, i.e., probability of successful defense of the HVU. 
B. NETWORK CONSTRUCTION 
1. Physical Network 
The path-finding algorithm uses an “expanded network” to identify transit paths 
over a hypothetical AT (Figure 2).  That network is based on a physical network 
( , )G V E=  in which the surface of the ocean in the AT is discretized into a set of vertices 
v V∈  representing potential waypoints in two-dimensional space; these vertices are 
connected by directed edges ( , )u v E∈  to represent potential transit segments for the 
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CSG between distinct vertices ,u v V∈ .  The CSG will transit from waypoint to waypoint 
along, and in the direction of, the specified edges (Carlyle et al. 2008). 
In this thesis, vertices are positioned in a grid with spacing in both coordinate 
axes of 2.5 nm (5000 yards).  The example network covers an area 125 nm wide by 62.5 
nm high: 51 vertices in the east-west, or x-coordinate direction, and 26 vertices in the 
north-south, or y-coordinate direction.  This contains land and shoal water that a CSG 
cannot traverse: vertices are created in this case, but not connected by edges. 
Edges ( , )u v E∈  connect vertices, except as noted above.  Each vertex that 
corresponds to “traversable water” is connected to its nearest neighbors, assuming they 
exist in the grid and are “traversable,” in the compass bearings 000, 045, 090, 135, 180, 
225, 270, and 315 degrees.  Montes (2005) suggests this spatial adjacency; see Figure 3.  
Each edge ( , )u v E∈  has a corresponding “physical length” that represents the geometric 
distance in nautical miles between edges and u v : An edge directed north, south, east or 
west has a length of 2.5 nm while an edge directed northwest, northeast, southwest or 
southeast has a length of 12.5 3.5≈  nm. 
A notional representation of the AT is shown in Figure 2 (the dimensions and 
placements are inexact).  Vertices are placed at the corners of the square boxes (there are 
no nodes at the intersections of the diagonal lines), and the heavy lines represent 
traversable arcs.  For simplicity, threat ASCM sites are located at network nodes on land, 
close to shore.  They are denoted as black dots in the figure. 
 11
 
Figure 2.   Notional representation of the AT (dimensions and placements not exact).  
Vertices lie at the corners of the square boxes (there are no vertices at the 
intersections of the diagonal edges), and the heavy lines represent traversable 
edges.  Threat ASCM sites are shown as three large black dots on three 
“untraversable vertices,” but, note that the later computational study uses different 
threat locations. (Source: Microsoft MapPoint). 
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Figure 3.   Spatial adjacencies for a vertex v  and associated bearings in degrees. 
2. Configurations and Direction of Travel 
The positioning of escort ships around the HVU is critical for optimizing CSG 
defense against ASCMs.  This research uses “configuration” to describe a specific escort 
configuration around the HVU.  We assume four escort ships in the CSG, and define 16 
unique configurations.  The CSG’s direction of travel must be taken into consideration as 
well.  This is discussed below. 
An expanded network ( , )H N A=  modifies the physical network G  by adding the 
16 configurations, 1 2 16{ , ,..., }f F f f f∈ =  to the vertices of G , as well as eight directions 
of travel 1 2 8{ , ,..., }d D d d d∈ = .  The CSG moves along a physical arc ( , )u v  in the 
direction of the arc uvd .  For simplicity, we assume that once the CSG reaches v , any 
direction uvd  is possible, except for 180uvd +  degrees, i.e., directly back from where the 
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CSG came.  A node is defined by , ,i v f d= , where v  is a vertex in the physical 
network,  f  is a configuration, and d  gives the direction that the CSG will travel from 
this vertex.  An arc in H  is defined by ( , )k i j= =  ( , , , , , )i i i j j ju f d v f d< > < > , where 
( , )i iu v  is a physical edge; id  is the bearing that the CSG must follow while transiting 
( , )i iu v ; and the transition from if  to jf  along ( , )i ju v  must be possible.  In a more 
precise model, the transition from if  in direction id  to jf  in direction jd  would also be 
restricted. 
Thus, the expanded network ( , )H N A=  is defined by 
{ , ,  ,  , }N V F D i v f d v V f F d D= × × = =< > ∈ ∈ ∈ , and   (3) 
 { ( , , ,  , , )  ( , ) ,  andA k u f d v f d u v E′ ′= = < > < > ∈  
transitions from  to   and  to  on ( , ) are feasible}.f f d d u v′ ′   (4) 
H may be viewed as existing in a three-dimensional space to allow for transitions 
between configurations and direction combinations ,f d  in the network.  Transitions 
are “allowable” (i.e., feasible) if they conform to certain constraints, such as an escort 
ship’s maximum stationing speed.  Stationing speed is defined as the escort’s required 
speed to maneuver to a new position relative to the HVU within a given period of time.  
Stationing speed is usually faster than the CSG’s normal transit speed (known as Speed 
of Advance).  We assume that the CSG is transiting the chokepoint as fast as it can, so 
that escorts can only fall back in their positions relative to the HVU.  Allowable 
transitions will be specified later, after we define configurations. 
3. Sector Representation 
Each configuration in this thesis is defined as a unique configuration of escorts 
positioned in “sectors” relative to the HVU.  A sector is defined as the space between the 
eight compass bearings 000, 045,…, 315 degrees.  The HVU is assumed to be headed 
“north relative,” that is, 000 degrees is always relative to the direction in which the HVU 
is heading.  This spatial representation allows each sector to be assigned a specific 
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number which remains unchanged, no matter what configuration the CSG uses in its 
transit path.  Each sector is numbered sequentially from one to eight; see Figure 4. 
In configuring escorts around an HVU in the littoral, it suffices to give positions 
by sector only, because the distance between the HVU and its escorts will be defined for 
the specific tactical requirements.  While not a defined standard by any means, eight 
sectors should be an adequate level of granularity for locating escorts. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Sector numbers relative to the HVU.  The HVU is headed north in this 
figure, but the sector numbers are always relative to the direction of travel. 
 
Table 1 defines the 16 configurations used in this thesis.  Ship placement in a 
sector is represented as a binary choice, where “1” indicates a ship positioned in the 
sector, and “0” indicates no ship positioned in the sector.  For example, configuration one  
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has escort ships in sectors one, two, seven, and eight; no ships are in sectors three, four, 
five and six.  We allow at most one escort per sector, because two ships in a single sector 
would be unrealistically crowded. 
 
 SECTOR 
Config. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
3 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
5 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
6 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
7 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
8 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
9 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
10 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
11 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
12 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
14 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
15 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
16 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Table 1.   Ship sector positioning for each configuration.  The value for the table 
entry (configuration, sector) specifies whether the given sector has one ship or no 
ships in it for that configuration. 
Table 2 shows the allowable configuration transitions, which we construct as a 
“transition matrix” that is used as an input to the algorithm.  These transitions are 
represented as a binary choice as well, where “1” indicates an allowable transition, and 
“0” indicates otherwise.  For example, a transition from configuration one to two is 
allowed, but a transition from two back to one is not. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Table 2.   Allowable transitions between configurations along an arc ( , ).k i j=  
C. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE 
The “risk” associated with an arc in the network is based on the CSG’s probability 
of successful defense, or “Pd,” associated with each arc 
( , ) ( , , ,  , , )k i j u f d v f d A′ ′= = < > < > ∈ .  In order to find a path with the highest 
probability of a successful transit, or “overall Pd,” we define the following model, 
“IXRP.”  We note that probability formulas are meant to impart a flavor of realism, but 
that more exact formulas would be needed in an operational model 
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Indices 
i N∈   node in expanded network 
1i   entry node in expanded network 
mi   terminal node in expanded network 
( , )k i j A= ∈  arc in expanded network 
if   configuration at node i  
id   direction of travel from node i  
it T∈   threats visible from node i  
tis   escort sector in which threat t  lies at node i  
tir   range from threat t  to node i  in nautical miles 
if
s S∈   sectors that contain an escort at node i  if the configuration is f  
Data 
kA   physical length of arc k  in nm 
maxL   maxk kA  
maxR   maximum range of threat missile 
Probabilities 
0φ  Nominal Pd given that the HVU traverses an arc length 
maxL , all within a threat zone, and without escorts; 0 0.9φ ≡  
in all tests 
( , , )S s s rφ ′  Pd given a single escort in sector s  with a threat entering 
from sector s′  at a range of r  nautical miles, but assuming 
the threat remains constant as the HVU and escort travel for 
a distance of maxL  nm 
( , , , )C i i ti tif d s rφ  Pd given escorts in configuration if  traveling in direction 
id  subject to a threat t  entering from sector tis  at a range 
of tir  nautical miles (and assuming the threats remain 
constant for a distance maxL  nm) 
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N
iφ  Pd at node i  over a fictitious arc of length maxL , pointed in 
direction id  and having configuration if  for its full length  
A




(1.0 min | |,8 | | if  
( , , )
0 if  
for any allowable transition from to ,  assuming the distance
between the threat and the CSG stays at 
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i i i ti ti
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f d s r iφ φ
∈
= ∀∏  (7) 
max/(( ) / 2) k LA N Nk i jφ φ φ= + A  ( , )k i j A∀ = ∈  (8) 
Formulation for IXRP 
 1 2 2 3 1Find a directed path {( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )}Path m mA i i i i i i−=  









The method used to calculate threat visibility resembles previous work by Leary 
(1995), who develops equations to compute radar ranges to arcs in a network.  We 
consider line-of-sight calculations to be a function of threats it T∈  visible from node i .  
For simplicity, each such threat site it T∈  is located at a vertex in the network 
representing land, close to shore, in the AT.  This prototypic model has only three 
different “elevations:” land, untraversable shoal water, and traversable water, which are 
described in detail in Chapter IV. 
A line is established between node i  and threat iT  to determine visibility.  If the 
length of that line exceeds maxR  (i.e., the maximum range of the threat missile in nautical 
miles), the threat is assumed to be “not visible.”  Otherwise, all intermediate nodes 
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between i  and iT  are identified.  If none of these nodes are “land nodes,” then iT  is 
assumed visible from i ; otherwise it is not.  If the threat is not visible from i , then it does 
not come into play when computing Niφ . 
In the above model, Akφ  is the probability of successfully traversing an arc of 
length maxL , given that the threat and configuration defined at node i  remains constant 
along the whole arc.  maxL  is the length of the longest arc in the network, and thus 
max 12.5L = .  For simplicity then, the probability of successfully traversing arc ( , )k i j=  
is taken as the average of Niφ  and Njφ , but adjusted for the actual length of the arc. 
 20
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 21
III. AN ALGORITHM FOR FINDING MAXIMUM-RELIABILITY 
PATHS FOR A CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 
This chapter first describes an algorithm, XRPA, for finding maximum-reliability 
paths in a standard network, and then shows how to modify that algorithm for the CSG-
routing problem.  The modified algorithm, IXRPA, works on an implicit representation 
of the expanded network.  We then provide pseudo-code for XRPA and IXRPA. 
A. AN ALGORITHM FOR FINDING MAXIMUM-RELIABILITY PATHS IN 
A STANDARD NETWORK 
We refer to the basic maximum-reliability path model as XRP.  The XRP 
algorithm is referred to as “XRPA.”  XRPA is a label-correcting algorithm for finding all 
-s v  maximum-reliability paths, where the reliability of a path pathE  is defined on the 







XRPA simply maximizes the above product, as in equation (1), rather than the 
sum in equation (2).  The following XRPA pseudo-code essentially implements the label-
correcting shortest-path algorithm using a deque, as described by Ahuja et al. (1993, pp. 
136-138, 143). 
Algorithm XRPA (A label-correcting algorithm for finding all s-v maximum-reliability 
paths) 
Input: ( , )G V E= , start vertex s V∈ , probabilities of successful defense Akφ  for all 
( , )u v E∈ ; 
Output: Maximum probability ( )P v  of successful transit from vertex s to all vertices 
v V∈ ; (The ()pred function encodes the “maximum-reliability tree” rooted at 
s, which is analogous to the shortest-path tree in a shortest-path algorithm.) 
{ 
[1]  Dummy; 
[2] ( ) 1;P s ←  
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[3]  ( ) 0 for all ;P u u V s← ∈ −  
[4]  ( ) ;pred s s←  
[5]  ( )  for all ;pred u v V s←∞ ∈ −  
[6]  Initialize deque  with ;Q s  
[7]  While (  not empty ) {Q  
[8]   Remove  from front of ;u Q  
[9]   For ( each edge of the form ( , ) ) {u v E∈  
[10]   If ( ( ) ( ) ) {uvP v P u p< ⋅  
[11]    If ( ( ) 0 ) {P v =  /* vertex v visited first time */ 
[12]     Put  on end of ;v Q  
} else {           /* vertex v has been visited before */ 
[13]     If ( ) Put  on front of ;v Q v Q∉  
} 
[14]    ( ) ( ) ;uvP v P u p← ⋅  




[16] For ( all ) Print( , ( ));v V v P v∈  
} 
B. IMPLICIT MAXIMUM-RELIABILITY PATH ALGORITHM (IXRPA) 
This section discusses how we modify XRPA in order to implicitly represent a 
maximum-reliability path operating on the expanded network ( , )H N A= .  We define an 
“implicit maximum-reliability path algorithm,” IXPRA, which adds allowable escort 
configurations, f F∈ , and direction of travel, d D∈ , to the above algorithm in addition 
to Akφ  for all edges ( , )u v E∈ . 
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C. PSEUDO-CODE FOR IXRPA 
Algorithm IXRPA (A label-correcting algorithm for finding all s-v maximum-
reliability paths on an explicit representation of the expanded network H ) 
Input: ( , )G V E= , start vertex s V∈ , probabilities of successful defense Akφ  for all 
( , )u v E∈ ; allowable escort configurations f F∈ , allowable directions of 
travel d D∈ ; 
Output: Maximum probability ( )P i  of successful transit from any start node starti N∈  
(defined below) to every expanded node i N∈ ; 
{ 
[1]  Define { }start start, , | , ,N v f d v V f F d D= < > ∈ ∈ ∈ ; 
 /* Some nodes in startN  may be invalid, but the algorithm will ignore these */ 
[2]       start( ) 1 ;P i i N← ∀ ∈  
[3]  ( ) 0 \ ;startP i i N N← ∀ ∈  
[4]  ( )  ;startpred i i i N← ∀ ∈  
[5]  ( )  \ ;startpred i i N N←∞ ∀ ∈  
[6]  Initialize deque  with ;Q s  
[7]  While (  not empty ) {Q  
[8]   Remove  from front of ;i Q  
[9] Let iu  denote the “tail vertex” associated with i  and let  iv  denote the               
h                head vertex associated with i    
  /*  i  defines a tail vertex iu  and a direction of travel, which thus defines  
  the next vertex, iv  */ 
[10] If iv  is a land node, continue; 
[11] For (each allowable configuration  at ){if v  
[12]   For (each allowable direction of travel at ){id v    
[13]                                Let j  denote the node defined by iv , f , and d ;   
[14]                               If ( ( ) ( ) ) {ijP j P i p< ⋅  
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[15]     If ( ( ) 0 ) {P j =  /* vertex i visited first time */ 
[16]      Put  on end of ;j Q  
 } else {           /* vertex i has been visited before */ 
[17]      If ( ) Put  on front of ;j Q j Q∉  
 } 
[18]     ( ) ( ) ;ijP j P i p← ⋅  
[19]     ( ) ;pred j i←  




[20] For( all ) Print( , ( ));i N i d i∈  
} 
 
Note: The actual algorithm has a simple “tie-breaking mechanism” added, that allows a 
path to be continued to a node j  if the current value of ( )P j  is the same as the updated 
value will be, but the new path will use fewer “hops,” i.e., arcs.  This avoids the creation 
of paths in which the CSG makes unnecessary course corrections when under no threat. 
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IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
This chapter begins by introducing three test scenarios, and then describes the 
results of running IXRPA to solve scenario 1, “IXRPl.”  We then present scenarios 2 and 
3, “IXRP2” and “IXRP3,” respectively, and show how their results differ from IXRP1.  
All test runs are carried out on a desktop computer with a 3.72 GHz Intel Xeon processor, 
3 gigabytes of RAM, the Microsoft Windows XP Professional operating system, and with 
programs written and compiled using Microsoft Visual C++ Version 6.0.  No scenario 
requires more than one second to evaluate. 
A. TEST SCENARIOS 
The test scenarios for this thesis cover the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2.  Hydrographic information for these scenarios is taken from 
Defense Mapping Agency nautical charts 62032 (1991) and 62510 (1999).  The network 
area for both scenarios is bounded between latitude lines 26° and 27°  North latitude and 
055 30° ′− and 057 20° ′−  East longitude.  This creates a grid network 125 nm “wide” by 
62.5 nm “high.”  A notional representation is shown in Figure 2.  This model represents a 
CSG that makes a one-way transit from origin to destination, e.g., entry into the AOR, 
from the Gulf of Oman to the Arabian Gulf.  Assuming different escort configurations 
may be required for an outbound transit, a separate model can determine an optimal path 
in the opposite direction. 
The AT is plotted on a grid of vertices with origin coordinates (1,1) in the 
southwestern corner of the AT. For simplicity, this is the CSG’s fixed destination, vertex 
t .  Also for simplicity, the CSG starts at a fixed vertex s at grid position (36,1), in the 
southeastern part of the AT. The CSG may begin and end its travel in any allowable 
direction of travel and configuration. 
Specific input values for the three test scenarios are given below: 
• 51nNodesX =  (number of nodes in the horizontal (x) direction.  Scale = 
2.5 nm per node) 
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• 26nNodesY =  (number of nodes in the vertical (y) direction.  Scale = 2.5 
nm per node) 
• Akφ  data for each arc k (edge, configuration and direction of travel) 
• max 25.0R =  (maximum threat range in nm) 
• 16nConfigs =  (number of configurations) 
• configSect  = matrix of the 16 configuration sectors (Table 1) 
• configTrans  = 16-by-16 matrix of allowable configuration transitions 
within the AT (Table 2) 
• 5nThreats =  (in coordinate location within the network) 
• Scenario threat locations (node coordinates): (7, 17), (17, 24), (27, 12), 
(29, 25), and (49, 12) 
• Terrain Data: 
o 0.0 = unrestricted (i.e., traversable) water 
o 1.0 = untraversable shoal water 
o 5.0 = land 
 
Several of the above parameters are “hardwired” in the code.  For instance, the 
number of configurations, nConfigs , has been set to 16, and the number of threats in the 
network, nThreats , has been set to five.  Each threat is assigned a coordinate position 
that remains fixed in the same location for all three scenarios.  We change the threat 
range parameter tRange  for a specific threat location in each scenario; tRange  can take 
values of 15, 25, or 35 nautical miles.  How threat range affects the CSG’s maximum-
reliability path will be shown below. 
This thesis assigns specific sector Pd values, or ( , , )S s s rφ ′ , to each inbound threat 
sector and corresponding escort sector.  These numbers represent Pd given a single escort 
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in sector s  with a threat entering from sector s′  at a range of r  nautical miles (equation 
5).  For example, suppose a threat missile is fired at the CSG from a bearing that brings it 
into sector one.  If an escort is located in sector one (i.e., sector one is occupied) then 
( , , ) 0.9S s s rφ ′ = .  Since sectors two and eight are adjacent to the escort in sector one, 
( , , ) 0.9S s s rφ ′ =  in those sectors as well.  ( , , ) 0.7S s s rφ ′ =  in sectors three and seven, and 
( , , ) 0.5S s s rφ ′ =  in sectors four, five, and six, since these three sectors are immediately 
opposite the HVU, and farthest away from the escort’s defensive capabilities. 
We use ( , , )S s s rφ ′  to compute ( , , , )C i i ti tif d s rφ , or Pd given escorts in 
configuration if  traveling in direction id , subject to a threat t  entering from sector tis  at 
a range of tir  nautical miles (equation 6).  Equations (5) and (6) assume that the threat 
remains constant as the HVU and its escorts travel for a distance of maxL  nautical miles.  
Once the above probabilities have been calculated, equations (7) and (8) are used to 
compute the values of Akφ  in the network. 
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B.  RESULTS FOR SCENARIO 1 
 
Figure 5.   Maximum-reliability path for Scenario 1.  The origin of this map is at the 
lower left-hand corner, with vertex coordinates (1,1).  ASCMs are located at 
coordinates (7, 17), (17, 24), (27, 12), (29, 25), and (49, 12).  The circles show the 
corresponding maximum ASCM ranges of 25 nm. At entry point (32,1)s =  the 
CSG’s initial configuration is one (all four escorts are leading, ahead of the 
HVU’s beam), traveling in direction one (north).  The CSG exits at (1,1)t =  in 
configuration 11, traveling in direction one (north).  Configuration numbers are 
shown next to the transit path.  Final 0.980407Akφ = . 
Figure 5 shows the CSG’s maximum-reliability path for Scenario 1.  Range 
circles with radius 25 nm are plotted around each threat missile site.  Terrain and water-
depth information is shown: traversable water is blue, with untraversable shoal water in 
light blue, and land in brown.  Figures 5, 7 and 8 were generated using MATLAB to 
display the algorithm results for all three test scenarios (Chapman 2002, pp. 52-58). 
The CSG uses three distinct configurations as it traverses the network in Scenario 
1 (Figure 6).  For example, upon entering the AT, the CSG is in Configuration 1: escorts 
are ahead of the HVU in sectors one, two, seven, and eight.  At coordinate (30,13) , the 
CSG transitions to Configuration 15 and all escorts fall back, moving astern of the HVU 






Traversable water  
1
11 
s = (32,1) 
15 
t = (1,1) 
 29
are used in Scenario 1.  All transitions are reasonable: as the CSG changes course and 
proceeds through the AT, escort configurations change as the threat bearings change 
relative to the HVU. 
 
                         
          Config. 1                                 Config. 15                               Config. 11 
Figure 6.   Configurations in the order they are used in Scenario 1. Escort locations 
are shown by the black rectangles in the sectors; the HVU is situated in the center.  
For instance, Configuration 1 has escorts in sectors 1, 2, 7 and 8.  (See Figure 4 
for sector definitions.) 
Table 3 shows the numerical data from IXRP1, which corresponds to the plot in 
Figure 5.  To convert from coordinate position to actual waypoint location, multiply the x 
and y coordinate numbers in the table by 2.5 nm.  Reading from the top left, the CSG is 
transiting from east to west through the AT, and enters the network at vertex (32,1)s =  in 
configuration one (all four escorts in leading positions, i.e. the four sectors forward of the 
HVU’s beam), transiting in direction one (000 degrees, or north), and Akφ  initially equal 
to 1.0, or a 100% chance of successful defense at entry into the AT.  The CSG transits 17 
more arcs before Akφ  values start to decrease, because all threats are out of range until 
arrival at vertex (35,16) .  The CSG exits at (1,1)t =  in configuration 11, transiting north, 
with a final probability of successful defense equal to 0.980407, meaning the CSG exits 

























32 1 1 1 1.000000 23 15 15 6 0.986602 
32 2 1 2 1.000000 22 14 15 6 0.985636 
33 3 1 2 1.000000 21 13 15 7 0.984623 
34 4 1 2 1.000000 20 13 15 6 0.983534 
35 5 1 2 1.000000 19 12 15 6 0.982354 
36 6 1 1 1.000000 18 11 15 6 0.981074 
36 7 1 2 1.000000 17 10 11 5 0.980407 
37 8 1 1 1.000000 17 9 11 5 0.980407 
37 9 1 1 1.000000 17 8 11 5 0.980407 
37 10 1 1 1.000000 17 7 11 5 0.980407 
37 11 1 2 1.000000 17 6 11 5 0.980407 
38 12 1 8 1.000000 17 5 11 6 0.980407 
37 13 1 1 1.000000 16 4 11 6 0.980407 
37 14 1 1 1.000000 15 3 11 6 0.980407 
37 15 1 1 1.000000 14 2 11 7 0.980407 
37 16 1 8 1.000000 13 2 11 7 0.980407 
36 17 1 6 1.000000 12 2 11 7 0.980407 
35 16 1 6 0.999326 11 2 11 7 0.980407 
34 15 1 6 0.998050 10 2 11 6 0.980407 
33 14 1 6 0.996908 9 1 11 7 0.980407 
32 13 1 6 0.995885 8 1 11 7 0.980407 
31 12 1 8 0.994963 7 1 11 7 0.980407 
30 13 15 8 0.993690 6 1 11 7 0.980407 
29 14 15 8 0.992464 5 1 11 7 0.980407 
28 15 15 7 0.991239 4 1 11 7 0.980407 
27 15 15 7 0.990010 3 1 11 7 0.980407 
26 15 15 7 0.989209 2 1 11 7 0.980407 
25 15 15 7 0.988386 1 1 11 1 0.980407 
24 15 15 7 0.987522      
Table 3.   Maximum-reliability path for Scenario 1 (IXRP1).  This path corresponds 
to the plot shown in Figure 5.  Reading from the top left, the CSG enters at 
(32,1)s =  in escort configuration one, transiting in direction one (000 degrees, or 
north), and Akφ  initially equal to 1.0.  To convert x-y coordinates into waypoint 
locations (nm), multiply the coordinate number by 2.5. 
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C. RESULTS FOR SCENARIO 2 
 
Figure 7.   Maximum-reliability path for Scenario 2.  (See Figure 5. for the labeling 
of the different entities in the map.) The origin of this map is at the lower left-
hand corner, with vertex coordinates (1,1).  ASCMs are located at coordinates (7, 
17), (17, 24), (27, 12), (29, 25), and (49, 12).  The circles show the corresponding 
maximum ASCM ranges of 25 nm, except for the ASCM located at (27, 12), 
whose range has been decreased to 15 nm.  At entry point (32,1)s =  the CSG’s 
initial configuration is one (all four escorts are leading, ahead of the HVU’s 
beam), traveling in direction one (north).  The CSG exits at (1,1)t =  in 
configuration 11, traveling in direction one (north).  Configuration numbers are 
shown next to the transit path. 
Scenario 2 (Figure 7) illustrates how the CSG’s path changes when one threat 
missile’s range is changed in the AT.  Scenario 1 is set up with all threat ranges set at 25 
nm.  In Scenario 2, the ASCM site located on the peninsula at coordinate (27,12)  
decreases its range from 25 to 15 nm.  Since this threat is now in range of fewer vertices 
in the AT, the CSG’s direction of travel changes from north (Figure 5) to west (Figure 7) 
much sooner than in scenario 1.  Consequently, the CSG’s Akφ  begins to decrease sooner 







the peninsula, since it “escapes” the peninsula threat faster.  The CSG exits at (1,1)t =  in 
configuration 11, transiting north, with a final probability of successful defense equal to 
0.985893. 
D.  RESULTS FOR SCENARIO 3 
 
Figure 8.   Maximum-reliability path for Scenario 3.  (See Figure 5. for a labeling of 
the different entities in the map.) The origin of this map is at the lower left-hand 
corner, with vertex coordinates (1,1).  ASCMs are located at coordinates (7, 17), 
(17, 24), (27, 12), (29, 25), and (49, 12).  The circles show the corresponding 
maximum ASCM ranges of 25 nm, except for the ASCM located at (29, 25), 
whose range has been increased to 35 nm. At entry point (32,1)s =  the CSG’s 
initial configuration is one (all four escorts are leading, ahead of the HVU’s 
beam), traveling in direction one (north).  The CSG exits at (1,1)t =  in 
configuration 11, traveling in direction one (north).  Configuration numbers are 
shown next to the transit path.  (The “jog” to the northwest taken by the CSG as it 
leaves the last threat zone is caused by a bug in the program that has not yet been 
identified.) 
The final scenario increases the range of ASCM site (29,25)  from 25 to 35 nm.  
Similar to scenario 2 (Figure 7), the CSG changes course from north to west much sooner 
in its transit to avoid the increased range of the ASCM site to the north (Figure 8).  The 











HVU’s port (left) side back to sectors six and seven.  This places the escorts more 
directly between the HVU and the threat to the south (i.e., the peninsula threat). 
The CSG changes to configuration 3 at coordinate (29,14) , shifting its escorts to 
cover the HVU’s port quarter (sectors five and six) from the peninsula threat as the CSG 
turns southwest.  The CSG changes to configuration 15 as it continues southwest and puts 
the peninsula threat directly on its stern.  At coordinate (19,5) , the CSG shifts one final 
time to configuration 11, which places escorts in sectors two, three, five, and six.  This 
configuration guards the HVU’s starboard (right) side from the ASCM site due north at 
coordinate (7,17) .  The CSG exits at (1,1)t =  in configuration 11, transiting north, with a 
final probability of successful defense equal to 0.950729. 
The table of probabilities is omitted for both scenarios 2 and 3. 
E. CONCLUSION ON COMPUTATIONAL TESTS 
Comparing final Akφ  values among the three scenarios illustrates the effect threat 
range has on the maximum-reliability path.  Probability of successful defense increases 
from 0.980407 to 0.985893 between scenarios 1 and 2.  This is reasonable, since in 
Scenario 2 the CSG spends less time inside the threat envelope of the ASCM on the 
peninsula.  It is also reasonable that Akφ  decreases to its lowest value, 0.950729, in 
scenario 3.  This is the only scenario in which the CSG is exposed to multiple threats 
simultaneously. 
The above scenarios show that based on transit geometry and threat location in 
the AT, the CSG relies primarily on configurations that place escorts ahead of the HVU, 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 35
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis develops a prototype routing model that can be used to select a 
maximum-reliability path for a carrier strike group (CSG), or other group of ships, 
transiting a maritime chokepoint subject to surface-to-surface missile threats.  The 
solution algorithm is a variant of a shortest-path algorithm that operates implicitly on the 
expanded network to maximize the CSG’s probability of successful defense, hence 
“maximizing reliability.”  The model addresses the need for flexible, detailed and 
automated integration of data affecting position selection for Air-Defense (AD) escorts in 
a CSG.  The model was tested on notional data from the Strait of Hormuz, but many 
applications exist worldwide. 
This problem is formulated and solved using a maximum-reliability path model 
(XRP) that identifies an optimal route for the CSG’s High Value Unit (HVU) through a 
chokepoint, along with appropriate escort configurations for each leg of the path.  XRP 
discretizes the chokepoint sea space into a network of vertices and edges representing 
potential waypoints and transit segments between waypoints.  This network was then 
“expanded” to include potential waypoints, HVU escort configurations, and directions of 
travel. 
Assuming all necessary probabilities are available, the model runs quickly for a 
real-world scenario based on the Strait of Hormuz (about one second on a personal 
computer).  The model finds an optimal path for the CSG based on the positioning of 
threat missile sites in the network, and as threat ranges change in the three test scenarios, 
so does the CSG’s optimal transit path and probability of successful defense, or “ Akφ .” 
Several simplifying assumptions are made for the sake of developing a usable 
model.  We assume independence of attack events on an arc from the various threats, and 
we also assume independence of events across arcs.  Given the network’s relatively short 
arc lengths (2.5 nautical miles), these assumptions are not likely to be true, but are 
reasonable for a prototype.  This prototype should provide the framework for a usable 
mission-planning aid for the fleet. 
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has developed a ship routing model based on a single type of threat, 
the shore-based C-802 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM).  In addition to the many 
different types of ASCM threats in existence today, it is well known that littoral, i.e., 
coastal, areas present multiple threats from enemy small boats and mines, just to name a 
few.  Different types of threats, and their corresponding Pk data, could be added to the 
model (in order to keep this research unclassified, no real threat Pk data was used), and 
real threat range and probability of successful defense data could be used. 
Escort ships in this model are considered to be indistinguishable, that is, each is 
equally capable of defending the HVU against a threat.  This may not be realistic, 
however.  Edge parameters represent the probability of successfully transiting between 
two adjacent waypoints given only one threat missile is launched per transit segment and 
per threat launcher, and the threat is in range of the CSG.  Allowing threat missiles to fire 
more than once on any path leg and restricting each side to a specific number of weapons 
are some other possible factors to explore in future research. 
Additional constraints on route selection might be developed as well, to ensure 
that the route selected is practical (Leary 1995).  For instance, more “untransitable” 
vertices could be added to restrict the CSG’s path to a maritime “traffic separation 
scheme,” or terrain vertices could be decomposed into several different elevations to 
enable line-of-sight calculations to more closely replicate actual terrain data.  Further 
research could also develop a more complex constrained shortest-path (CSP) network 
configuration that adds side constraints or expands network vertices by time or fuel 
consumption.  
The data needed to properly route a CSG through a chokepoint do not exist today, 
or would take an inordinate amount of time to compute.  This thesis has shown a general 
method is viable to identify an optimal transit path for a CSG through a maritime 
chokepoint once those data become available.  Given the many potential threats facing 
today’s navy in the littorals, this subject is vitally important. 
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